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 Micro-founded measurement of regional competitiveness 
in Europe 
Gábor Békés - Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Enhancing competitiveness is a popular target in economic policy making – not only at the 
national, but at the regional level as well despite neither generally accepted definition nor any 
strong agreement on how to measure it. In this chapter we discuss the conceptual 
underpinnings of why it is interesting to unpack the economic performance of a country into 
the economic performance of its regions. We argue that as firms compete; measuring 
regional competitiveness should be also based on comparing firm performance across EU 
regions. Given available data, we propose a new way to gauge how firms fare is to look at 
their ability to access and penetrate world markets. The key index is export per worker from a 
region to non-EU destinations relative to the EU average – a „regional competitiveness‟ index 
that captures the capacity of a region‟s firms to outperform the firms of the average EU 
region in terms of exports.  
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Európai regionális versenyképesség vállalatalapú mérése 
 
Békés Gábor - Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
 
A versenyképesség javítása a gazdaságpolitikai döntéshozatal népszerű célja mind országos, 
mind regionális szinten annak ellenére, hogy mérésével kapcsolatban nincs általánosan 
elfogadott szabály, de még erős egyetértés sem.  Ebben a tanulmányban annak fogalmi 
alapjait fogjuk körüljárni, hogy miért érdekes egy ország gazdasági teljesítményét régióinak 
teljesítményeire szétbontva értékelni. A vállalatok versenyző magatartása alapján úgy véljük, 
hogy a regionális versenyképesség mérésének a vállalati teljesítmények összehasonlításán 
kellene alapulnia az Európai Unió régióit tekintve. A rendelkezésre álló adatok alapján egy új 
módszert javasolunk a vállalatok sikerességének mérésére: a világ piacaihoz való 
hozzáférésük és az azokra történő belépésük képességét. A kulcsmutató az egy dolgozóra jutó, 
adott régióból a nem EU tag partnerek felé irányuló export az EU átlaghoz viszonyítva – egy 
‟regionális versenyképességi‟ index, amely megragadja azt a képességet, hogy egy régió 
vállalatai az átlagos EU régió vállalatait export terén felülmúlják.  
 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: export, regionális versenyképesség, mérés, granularitás 
 
 
JEL kód: R11, F14, R58 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Enhancing „competitiveness‟ is a popular target in economic policy making - at both the 
national and the regional levels. International regional competitiveness recently was 
developed into smart, sustainable and inclusive growth objectives of the Europe 2020 policy 
program. While a huge amount of development funds are allocated for serving this purpose, 
the concept of „competitiveness‟ is still a rather mysterious and often debated issue. There is 
neither any generally accepted definition nor any strong agreement on how to measure it. 
While this is true for both nations and regions, the aim of this chapter is to discuss how some 
progress could be made at the regional level.   
The regional level is important because regional diversity within the EU is substantial, 
and regional disparities matter at the national level in a context where GDP per capita 
differences across regions within EU countries are comparable to the differences observed 
between more and less developed EU countries. For instance, while Romania has a per capita 
GDP that is 32% of the per capita GDP of Germany (at PPP), the poorest Romanian region 
(North-East) has a per capita GDP that is just 26% of the per capita GDP of the richest one 
(Bucharest). As a result of pronounced regional disparities, even within the same country, 
people living in poor regions have much fewer work opportunities  and, as long as local 
services are financed by local governments through local taxation, also much less access to 
education and healthcare. This is why measuring „regional competitiveness‟ as a driver of 
regional economic performance has been considered an objective worth pursuing. 
In this chapter we will do three things. First, in Section 2 we will discuss the conceptual 
underpinnings of why it is interesting to unpack the economic performance of a country into 
the economic performance of its regions. In particular, based on the academic literature, we 
will discuss how „proximity‟ matters in the sense that several key interactions between people 
and firms that are at the core of economic performance peeter out very rapidly as distance 
increases, making the local context the scale at which most of the action takes place. On the 
other hand, we will argue that, once the local context is targeted, the economy becomes 
extremely „granular‟ in the sense that local economic performance even more than national 
performance ends up being driven by the fortunes of a handful of firms that are large (at least  
relative to the local context). In other words, it is the importance of „proximity‟ that makes 
„granularity‟ more salient. 
Second, in Section 3 we will explore the implications of „proximity‟ and „granularity‟ for 
how one may want to think of and measure „regional competitiveness‟. The basic idea is that, 
if „proximity‟ makes the regional dimension crucial and „granularity‟ implies that few large 
firms determine regional destinies, a natural way to assess regional performance is to look at 
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how large firms fare across regions. We will then argue that, given available data, an effective 
way to gauge how large firms fare is to look at their ability to access and penetrate world 
markets. In this respect, we will propose a pragmatical definition of „regional 
competitiveness‟. This type of firms typically account for dominant shares of employment, 
sales and profits. They are more capital intensive and pay higher wages. They invest more in 
capital and human resources. They are the main actors in innovation. Our approach is 
practical because it measures „regional competitiveness‟ in terms of actual rather than 
potential outcomes, and focuses on an outcome variable that is correlated but more easily 
measurable that several other obvious outcome variable. 
Third, in Section 4 we will discuss the data needed to compute our proposed measure of 
„regional competitivenes‟, whether they are currently available for EU regions and how their 
availability could be improved. We note here that the administrative definition of „region‟ 
does not necessarily coincide with the relevant definition based on the intensity of actual 
interactions between people and firms. This is an old issue with a long tradition on which we 
have little to add, apart from stressing that data are typically collected according to the 
administrative definition and this is the definition that matters most in terms of regional 
policies. 
While Section 5 will draw conclusions, two preliminary caveats are in order. On the one 
hand, as the ideal data are not available, this chapter should be taken as a methodological 
contribution to the policy debate on „regional competitiveness‟ rather than an attempt to 
precisely measure „regional competitiveness‟. Accordingly, we will use the available data to 
provide specific examples rather an overall assessment of „regional competitiveness‟ across 
the EU. Moroever, due to their limited purpose our examples will take stapshots of the 
situation at any point in time on statics, leaving aside the question of how patterns evolve 
through time. On the other hand, we do not take any stance on the relation between „regional 
competitiveness‟ and „regional convergence‟ in economic performance. One may want (all) 
regions to be „competitive‟ because one wants them to compete. In this perspective, 
competition among regions may be considered good in itself. However, competition is a 
dynamic process and one should not expect necessarily a balanced distribution of economic 
activities at any point in time. Due to the pull of „proximity‟, one may even expect some 
degree of (sound) regional imbalances at all points in time.  
To our knowledge, the closest research to ours is Konings  and Marcolin (2011) who uses 
firm level data to access the  competitiveness of Belgian and German regions. In line with our 
work, the concept authors use does not “engage in measuring different potential drivers of 
productivity (with the risk of omitting some), but will directly capture the productivity level 
of firms that are active in a particular region.”  Similarly, they note the importance of large 
firms, arguing that by using firm level data they are “also able to analyze the dependence of 
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regions on a few large firms, which reveals potential vulnerability in terms of relocation 
threats”. The data are derived from EU company accounts of the Amadeus dataset by Bureau 
Van Dijk (BvD) for 2005 and 2008 for medium and large sized companies. Authors compute 
labor productivity ( value added per worker), take the ratio of the average labor cost and the 
average labor productivity, a measure a relative cost of a unit produced – the preferred 
measure of competitiveness.  Our method is an alternative that focuses even more on the 
“outcome” of competition, but is, nevertheless, likely to be correlated with the Konings  and 
Marcolin measure.  
2. NEW FOUNDATION FOR REGIONAL POLICIES: PERFORMANCE OF 
REGIONS IS DRIVEN BY LOCALIZED EXTERNALITIES AND 
GRANULARITY 
 
Why it is interesting to unpack the economic performance of a country into the economic 
performance of its regions? The answer has to do with the concepts of „proximity‟ and 
„granularity‟. 
2.1 PROXIMITY 
Firms compete not only through their internal capabilities, resources and business networks, 
but also thorough the business environments they come from. Institutions, regulations, 
demand conditions and many other factors of their countries of origin determine the quality 
and the availability of their inputs (from labor to intermediate goods and services) as well as 
their sales opportunities. As suggested by a long line of academic and business consultancy 
studies, national determinants are essential.  
However, several key interactions between people and firms that are at the core of 
economic performance are effective at a smaller scale than the country level. These processes 
include labor market interactions, knowledge spillovers, trade transactions between 
collaborating firms and even mutual trust. The fact that some important economic 
interactions are constrained by proximity is one of the reasons why the concept of „regional 
competitiveness‟ may be worth exploring. Indeed, even within a country regions can offer 
rather varied business environments, including variation in labor force quality, in 
agglomeration and diversity of firms, in research and development infrastructure, in urban 
services.  
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Agglomeration forces 
 
Concentration of economic activity in some regions within a country, or in some cities within 
a region, has been identified as a key driver of economic performance.  
Firms agglomerate to benefit from „Marshallian externalities‟ enjoyed at proximity of each 
other as well as to save on transaction costs when working together in supply chains or in 
networks of knowledge and innovation. This is argued, for example, by models of the so-caled 
„new economic geography‟ (see, e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999 or Baldwin, Forslid, 
Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud 2003) as well as by models of regional growth with 
knowledge spillovers (Ciccone and Hall 1996). These models suggest that interactions 
between people and forms with positive value larger than that signalled by market prices 
(„positive externalities‟) can arise through several channels, such as sharing indivisible goods, 
saving on matching costs of workers with firms and learning from each other (Duranton and 
Puga 2004). When „positive externalities‟ require people and firms to be close to each other, 
they generate „agglomeration forces‟ leading to the geographical co-location of economic 
activities. At the same time, competition between co-localized people and firms for locally 
scarse resources generates „dispersion forces‟ that cut into the benefits of agglomeration. 
In the models of „new economic geography‟, proximity has several major implications. 
First, when firms co-locate, they offer more job opportunities and hence attract people as 
well. This increases the size of the local market and reduces the need to import final goods 
from elsewhere, thus, reduces the average transport cost embedded in the consumption 
bundle of local residents. Second, proximity entails also cheaper transport between firms, as 
the producers of intermediate goods are located closer to their end users. Third, the „total 
factor productivity‟ (TFP) of firms (i.e. their efficiency in using given amounts of inputs to 
produce output) may also increase thanks to knowledge spillovers from other producers. As 
long as all these effects entail some degree of „externality‟, the impact of proximity on income 
will be more than proportional to the number of co-located firms.  
A fourth implication is related to labor productivity in larger and denser areas, 
particularly in cities (Puga 2010). This greater efficiency of labor may be partially explained 
by productivity gains at the firm level translated into gains of marginal labor productivity but 
also by „spatial sorting‟ as richer job opportunities where firms co-locate are 
disproportionately seized by more talented people. Indeed several studies find that about half 
of the earning surplus achieved in denser areas come from spatial sorting. On the other hand, 
there are some aspects of larger and denser urban areas that are conducive to learning and 
personal improvement fostered by peer pressure, more valuable experience and easier access 
to a variety of educational services.    
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Agglomeration and dispersion forces are in practice quite hard to disentangle. However, 
their combined effect on labor productivity can be estimated and has been found to be 
positive. For example, Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Ciccone (2002) find that the elasticity of 
labor productivity to people‟s density is 6 and 5 percent on average in the US and EU 
respectively. These early findings are in the ball park of recent estimates for European 
countries that control for firm selection and the exogenous attributes of different urban areas 
(Duranton et al 2012).  
Circular or cumulative causation à la Myrdal, between agglomeration and innovation, is 
stressed by models of regional growth that add to the „new economic geography‟ perspective a 
dynamic dimension in terms of endogenous growth spurred by technological progress and 
localized knowledge spillovers. In this perspective innovation is key with agglomerated 
production and agglomerated innovation reinforcing each other. For example, in the model 
by Minerva and Ottaviano (2009) economic interactions between regions are affected by both 
the transport costs of exchanging goods and the communication costs of exchanging 
knowledge. When innovation takes place in a region, this generates faster growth and higher 
income, which in turn increases local demand and local profits. But higher profits make 
additional innovation more attractive. This leads to faster growth and higher so that 
cumulative causation between agglomeration and growth kicks in.  
Distance decay 
 
By now there is a large body of evidence suggesting that the impact of agglomeration decays 
rapidly with distance. This pattern is observed for various types of economic interactions 
such trade in intermediate inputs or knowledge cross-fertilization spillovers in academia or 
business.  
Firms trade with one another by buying and selling raw materials, intermediates or 
capital goods („demand and cost linkages‟). To save on transport costs, they often cluster 
together in space, especially within industries. Duranton and Overman (2005) consider 
manufacturing industries in Britain and investigate the extent of co-location of firms within 
industries and the role of distance. They find that about half of the four-digit industries are 
localized and localization mostly takes place at small scales below 50 km. The graph below 
illustrate this pattern using the index developed by the authors. 
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    Figure 1. 
 A spatial decay function for localization 
 
Index of global localization when weighting establishments by their 
employment. Source: Duranton and Overman (2005 p. 1096) 
 
Gains from proximity to other companies are localized – also when considering trade 
relations. For instance, Amiti and Cameron (2007) use the theoretical framework developed 
by Krugman, Venables and Fujita (1999) to estimate the benefits of agglomeration arising 
from vertical linkages between Indonesian firms using a manufacturing survey of firms at 
Indonesian district level. Their results show that positive externalities arising from demand 
and cost linkages are quantitatively important and highly localized. Strengthening cost 
linkages (through better access to suppliers) or demand linkages (through closer proximity to 
corporate customers) from the 10th to the 90th percentile raises wages and thus labor 
productivity by more than 20%. These productivity gains are, however, highly localized 
spreading over only a short distance: 90% of the spillover is observed at the firm‟s close 
proximity (within 108km for proximity to customers and within 262km for proximity to 
suppliers). If all Indonesian districts were 20% closer to each other, the resulting improved 
supplier access and market access would lead to an average increase in wages of 1.7%, and 
2.9%, respectively. 
Spatial concentration enhances productivity and drives wages higher – but only in 
proximity to productivity shocks. Using US data Rosenthal and Strange (2008) estimate the 
relationship between agglomeration externalities related to human capital and workers‟ 
wages at Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level with 1239 spatial units at hand. First, the 
spatial concentration of employment is found to be positively related to wage with the urban 
density premium being driven by proximity to college educated workers. Second, these 
effects attenuate sharply with distance: benefits of education and gains from being close to 
educated people fall dramatically with distance. In particular, the wage increasing effect of 
being close to educated people falls by 75% as the distance rises from 5 to 15 miles.  
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Knowledge spillovers – i.e. the transfer of scientific or practical information between 
companies - is a key motivation for investment support programs offered in most countries 
and regions. Lychagin, Pinkse, Slade and Van Reenen (2010) measure spillover from 
knowledge laboratories in the US. They use a measure of geographic proximity based on the 
distribution of firms‟ inventors‟ locations instead of their HQ addresses to better capture the 
flow of scientific knowledge. They find that 90% of knowledge transmission happens within a 
few hundred kilometers from labs, and spillovers are small or virtually nonexistent beyond 
500km.   
 Anderson, Quigley and Wilhelmsson (2009) consider knowledge spillovers in Sweden 
after a policy intervention aimed at decentralizing post-secondary education throughout the 
country. They use annual estimates of output per worker for each of 284 local civil divisions 
to measure local productivity. Innovative activity is found to be related to the comprehensive 
records of patent awards, which also include the inventor‟s home address. Estimates clearly 
suggest that productivity gains are highly localized. The spillovers from researchers employed 
at old and new institutions are concentrated: roughly 40% of the cumulative gain in 
productivity materializes within 10 km from the old institutions and for new universities this 
attenuation effect is even higher. 
All in all, estimates suggest that positive externalities are typically effective in a narrow 
radius of 5-25km for interactions between people and 50-150km for interactions between 
firms. Hence, proximity matters and this makes it useful to unpack the economic 
performance of a country into the economic performance of its regions.   
2.3. GRANULARITY 
In most countries, a handful of firms are responsible for a large fraction of economic activity, 
including export sales and foreign direct investment. 1  
Dominant firms 
 
Gabaix (2011) estimates that the business cycle movements of the largest 100 firms in the 
United States explain a third of the aggregate movements in output growth. In European 
countries, even after disregarding firms with less than 10 employees as most datasets do, 1% 
of the firms produce over 75% of output or of foreign sales. These are the dominant firms that 
are also important for their impact on business cycles. This dominance is exacerbated at a 
regional level, and the more so the finer the level of spatial disaggregation. Kleinert et al 
(2012) show how the features of a small number of large foreign-owned firms can explain 
several aspects of regional business cycles in France.  
                                                        
1 For details, see Gabaix (2011), di Giovanni & Levchenko (2011) or Mayer-Ottaviano(2008).  
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 „Granularity‟ captures this idea that a few selected companies play a dominant role for 
regional and national economic performance. In principle, it has little to do with 
externalities. Firm size may follow a „power law‟ (i.e. exhibit log-linear distribution), a 
property initially uncovered by Gibrat (1931) in the case of French firms.2 More recent 
research by Axtell (2001) on US firms estimates a power law with exponent 1.059 ± 0.054. 
This is very close to 1, a special case of the power law known as Zipf‟s law. In this special case 
the second largest firm is half the size of the largest one, the third largest firm is one-third of 
the largest one, and so on and so forth. This can be shown to be the result of random firm 
growth. If different firms grow randomly with the same expected percentage growth rate 
(which equals the average firm growth rate) and face the same variance in percentage grow 
rates, the limit distribution of firms sizes converges to Zipf‟s law characterized by the 
presence of few dominant firms.  
While other factors may concur to the emergence of few dominant firms (such as public 
intervention or imperfect competition), the key point is that the importance of „proximity‟ 
makes the local context the scale at which most of the action takes place and, once the local 
context is targeted, the economy becomes extremely „granular‟ as local economic 
performance even more than national performance ends up being driven by the fortunes of a 
handful of firms that are large (at least  relative to the local context).  
“Million dollar plants” 
 
Granularity makes it natural for local leaders to commit public funds to attracting 
investments by large companies. This may imply particularly large sums in the case of large 
multinationals. Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (2010) report that in 1991 BMW was 
handed out $115m in grants to subsidize a new plant in Greenville-Spartanburg county in 
South Caroline in return for an investment creating 2000 jobs. The cost and benefit analysis 
hinged upon the hope of BMW creating an additional 2000 jobs and generating massive 
gains within the county. Comparing the economic performance of counties that managed to 
attract similarly large investments – called “million dollar plants” - with those of counties 
that almost managed but did not quite succeed, Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (2010) 
are able to identify the associated gains  by measuring spillovers to other businesses, wages 
and house prices. They find that the industry of the winning county benefitted substantially 
over the five years following the investment: output rose, the TFP of existing companies grew 
and wages increased.3 This gains have to be weighed against the possible monopsonistic 
power of dominant firms with respect to local workers, local supplier and local authorities 
(Kleinert et al., 2012).  
                                                        
2 In a similar vein, Gabaix (1999) shows that the Zipf‟s law in city size distribution. 
3 Even if overall gains may in general not much subsidies spent on projects. 
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3. “REGIONAL COMPETITIVENESS” 
We now explore the implications of „proximity‟ and „granularity‟ for how one may want to 
think of and measure „regional competitiveness‟.  
„Competitiveness‟ is a notoriously elusive concept. In its most general definition it refers 
to the performance of the unit of analysis relative to some chosen benchmark. Specific 
definitions then differ in terms of the unit of analysis, the exact measure of performance,  or 
the chosen benchmark.   
Among the several definitions of competitiveness, two stand out as particularly relevant 
for the discussion of „regional competitiveness‟: a macroeconomic definition that takes the 
country as the unit of analysis; and a microeconomic definition that focuses, instead, on the 
firm. The concept of „national competitiveness‟ is often used in the analysis  of a country's  
macroeconomic performance relative to its trading partners with an emphasis on the factors 
that help explain relative export performance. These include both more qualitative factors, 
such technological innovativeness, product specialization and product quality, and more 
quantitative factors, such as cost-effectiveness and productivity. The problem with this 
approach is that, even when all factors are favorable, they do not necessarily lead to more 
exports as they may mostly show up as exchange-rate appreciation and better terms of trade. 
That is why standard measures of national competitiveness rely on a more restricted notion 
of relative performance related to international cost or price differentials .4 This is the logic 
underpinning the dominant use of the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) -- with the 
underlying relative price and cost indicators -- to measure a country‟s national 
competitiveness.5 
The use of the term „competitiveness‟ to refer to relative national trade performance has 
been heavily criticized by economists.6 The reason is twofold. First, it gives the impression 
that trade performance is an objective worth pursuing per se at the national level whereas the 
trade balance should be viewed as only a channel through which a country can borrow from 
or lend to other countries. And whether borrowing or lending are good or bad cannot be 
assessed in absolute terms but rather depends on the return on investment. Second, it 
suggests that factors, such as technological innovativeness, product specialization, product 
quality, cost-effectiveness and productivity, have some value only because they help the 
country gain international market shares, whereas they should be considered as important 
per se as, even in autarky, they would affect the national living standards. 
                                                        
4 Riley (2012)  
5 http://www.bis.org/publ/econ39.htm; https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/exchange/hci/html/index.en.html  
6 See, e.g., Krugman (???) 
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A reason for this confusion between ends and means arguably lies in the application to 
the analysis of country performance of notions first developed to describe firm performance. 
From this microeconomic point of view, competitiveness refers to the fact that a firm 
outperforms its „competitors‟ in terms of size (employment, output, revenue) and profitability 
thanks to everything that affects the perceived quality of the firm‟s products and its cost-
effectiveness in supplying them. When benchmark competitors consist of all firms in the 
same sector producing in the same place, a firm‟s competitiveness boils down to its own 
ability to generate more added value from any given amount of inputs, i.e. from its measured 
„total factor productivity‟ (TFP). When benchmark competitors consist, instead, of all firms in 
the same sector selling in the same place,  a firm‟s competitiveness is a nexus of its measured 
TFP and all the external factors that determine the quality- cost effectiveness of the place 
where the firm supplies from. These external factors link the microeconomic and the 
macroeconomic dimensions of competitiveness (with the caveat that what is good for the firm 
is not necessarily good for the place where the firm operates, and vice versa). 
The distinction between the macroeconomic and microeconomic definitions of 
competitiveness percolates to the regional level. However, when it comes to „regional 
competitiveness‟, the notion of competitiveness as a relative performance outcome driven by 
a given set of factors is often lost. For example, underlying the „Regional Competitiveness 
Index‟ (RCI) of the European Commission there seems to be a notion of competitiveness as a 
process with its own inputs and outputs. Specifically: 
“the index is based on eleven pillars describing both inputs and outputs of territorial 
competitiveness, grouped into three sets describing basic, efficiency and innovative factors of 
competitiveness. The basic pillars represent the basic drivers of all economies. They include (1) 
Quality of Institutions, (2) Macro-economic Stability, (3) Infrastructure, (4) Health and the (5) 
Quality of Primary and Secondary Education. These pillars are most important for less 
developed regions. 
The efficiency pillars are (6) Higher Education and Lifelong Learning (7) Labour Market 
Efficiency and (8) Market Size. The innovation pillars, which are particularly important for the 
most advanced regional economies, include (9) Technological Readiness, (10) Business 
Sophistication and (11) Innovation. This group plays a more important role for intermediate 
and especially for highly developed regions. Overall, the RCI framework is designed to capture 
short- as well as long-term capabilities of the regions”7 
 
This notion of „regional competitiveness‟ as a process drifts away from both the 
macroeconomic and the microeconomic definitions of competitiveness. Bundling outputs and 
inputs of the process together as „pillars‟ creates a taxonomy that may be useful to someway 
rank regions on a set of more or less reasonable criteria but transforms the concept of 
competitiveness into some magic black box of limited practical use.  
Based on the macroeconomic and microeconomic traditions, we want to peddle, instead, 
the idea that the most useful way to think about „regional competitiveness‟ is in terms of a 
                                                        
7 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/6th_report/rci_2013_report_final.pdf  
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measurable relative outcome driven by measurable factors. And that the only meaningful 
outcome that can be called „competitiveness‟ of  a region is the performance of its firms 
relative to their competitors in benchmark regions.  
The focus on firm performance has several advantages. First, while it is true that what is 
good performance for a region‟s firms is not necessarily good performance for its people, in 
practice the two are highly correlated.  Second, „competitiveness‟ may be a disputed concept 
in the case of places, but it is a generally accepted concept in the case of firms. Third, when it 
comes to regional policy, a lot of „competition‟ among regions is about attracting „competitive 
firms‟ as these hire more workers, offer better job security, pay higher wages, invest more 
(also in human resources), generate more revenues and profits, and therefore allow regions 
to raise more tax revenues for any given tax rate.   
The fact that „competitive firms‟ are better along several dimension raises the thorny 
question of which measure of performance should be used to identify them. Recent 
developments in the academic literature on international trade come to rescue. These 
developments show that all measures of firm performance are driven by firm TFP.8 They also 
show that the best proxy of exceptional TFP for a firm is its export participation and 
intensity: whether or not the firm is an exporter, and how much it exports. Hence, export 
becomes a crucial indicator of „competitiveness‟.9 This bridges the macroeconomic and 
microeconomic views on „competitiveness‟, and has the additional advantage of avoiding the 
direct estimation of firm TFP, which often requires unachievable standards in terms of data 
availability and still faces some open methodological issues.10 Data on European firms 
indeed reveal a positive correlation at the firm level between TFP and export share of 
revenues.   
Specifically, consider the export activities of firms located in different EU regions and 
active in some sector s. Consider a EU origin region o and a non-EU export destination d that 
is far enough from Europe and without former colonial, cultural or language links with any 
EU country to be equally „accessible‟ from all EU regions (e.g. China). Let Lo,s denote 
employment by sector s in region o and Xo,s denote exports of sector s from region o to 
destination d. Analogously, let Ls denote total EU employment in sector s and Xs denote total 
EU exports to d in sector s. Then compute the share of region o in total EU exports 
normalized by the share of region o in total EU employment in the sector. We take the 
resulting „normalized export share‟ 
                                                        
8 See, e.g., Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) 
9 Firms that not only export but are also directly investing abroad (FDI) are even more exceptional. Indeed, 
„internationalization‟ in general (i.e. selling to customers on a global market) is what we have in mind. 
However, we prefer to focus on exports as data are more easily available. Considering also FDI would increase 
the importance of the top 5% of firms. 
10 See, e.g., Bartelsman et al (2013) 
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as our measure of the „regional competitiveness‟ of region o in sector s. This can be rewritten 
as 
 
 
 
which is export per worker from region o to destination d relative to the EU average.  Hence, 
our „regional competitiveness‟ captures the capacity of a region‟s firms to outperform the 
firms of the average EU region in terms of exports. It is worth stressing that this does not 
imply that we see export as good in itself but rather the reason why we focus on export is that 
it is a strong indicator of the TFP of firms in the region. 
According to the academic literature on which this argument is based, export proxies 
exceptional firm productivity because firms have to be very productive in order to generate 
the revenues needed to cover the additional costs they face in serving foreign markets. Some 
of these costs are due to the fixed initial investment required in breaking into a market (such 
as the costs of creating a distribution network), others are recurrent and vary with the 
amounts shipped (such as transport costs and tariff barriers).  Fixed export costs affect the 
number of producers that are able to export („extensive margin‟); variable export cost affect 
the amount of shipments per exporter („intensive margin‟). 
To capture these two dimensions, we denote the numbers of exporters and producers in 
region o (in the EU) by no,s (ns) and No,s (Ns) respectively. This allows us to decompose the 
normalized export share into two multiplicative components as  
 
where xo,s (xs) denotes average export per exporter and lo,s (ls) denotes average employment 
per producer in region o (in the EU) respectively. We then use the „extensive‟  and the 
„intensive‟ normalized export shares 
 
 
to measure region o‟s „extensive regional competitiveness‟ and „intensive regional 
competitiveness‟ in sector s. These capture the extent to which regional competitiveness is 
affected by fixed vs. variable export costs. In particular, the importance of the extensive 
margin suggests that firms have to be productive enough in order to break into the export 
market. This implies that regional competitive is driven not only by the TFP of the average 
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firm (which affects the extensive margin) but also by the fraction of local firms whose TFP is 
high enough to overcome the fixed cost of export. Hence, our measure of regional 
competitiveness puts a premium on the concentration of firms in the upper tail of the TFP 
distribution („granularity‟). 11 As these are the firms that hire more workers, offer better job 
security, pay higher wages, invest more (also in human resources), and generate more 
revenues and profits, this premium is  not unwarranted.12    
A final caveat is in order. Our notion of regional competitiveness is sectoral in nature, the 
idea being that it does not makes much sense to try to gauge the relative performance of two 
regions by comparing the productivity of firms that operate in different sectors. Yet, the 
inter-sectoral perspective may also be important from a risk sharing point of view: is it better 
for a region to be very competitive in fewer sectors or someway less competitive in a larger 
number of sectors? The answer depends on how risk is shared with other regions through 
labor and capital mobility or redistributive policies. This, however, shifts the focus from 
regional to national competitiveness and goes beyond the scope of our analysis.   
4. MEASUREMENT ISSUES 
4.1 IDEAL DATA 
In this section, we contrast our first best approach to data reality. We start by describing how 
an ideal dataset – building on existing but not easily accessible data – looks like, followed by 
a discussion of major issues and challenges. We acknowledge that while the data we need do 
exist, access to data is very difficult in most countries, and coming up with a harmonized, 
distributed data approach is hard.   
For any given year, the competitiveness index for a region o and industry sector s is 
created in several steps. The data need is quite extensive. First, we need firm level balance 
sheet data with information regarding the number of employees, industry classification. This 
data is available for almost all EU countries but often with limitations. It is missing for 
Croatia, for Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland firms are only surveyed beyond a size limit 
(typically 10-50).  
Second, we need information about the location of the firm, at least at some regional 
level. For several countries, a NUTS2 or NUTS3 code is directly available. In other countries, 
the city or the ZIP code of HQ is available in addition to financial data, although it sometimes 
                                                        
11 See Barba Navaretti et al (2014) for a discussion of the importance of higher moments of the productivity 
distribution in explaining aggregate export performance. Duranton et al (2012) discuss how these moments 
are shaped by agglomeration economies.  
12 See, e.g., Gabaix (2013) for a discussion of the role of large firms for the economic activity at the national level. 
Large firms are even more important at the regional level as implied by the notion of „balls and bins‟ put forth 
by Armenter and Koren (2014).  
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require merging data from corporate registry. Third, we need firm level dataset matched with 
customs data with detailed information about exports, including destination countries, and 
ideally, products as well. Customs data is more and more available in Europe.  
Provided that all data would be available the key task is to decide upon aggregation 
details. Based on availability information13, considering NUTS2 regions, 2 digit NACE 
revision 2 industry classification should work for almost all countries. We present an example 
of the procedure using Hungarian data in the Appendix of this chapter.  
Another option would be to use private/survey data as in Konings and Marcolin (2011). 
The advantage of such dataset is availability for many countries. At the same time, in lack of 
trade data, it can only use balance sheet information that is often hard to compare across 
countries that differ substantially in accounting and reporting standards.   
 
4.2 DATA PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES 
A. Regional definitions 
Before turning to data issues to generate our preferred variable, we should acknowledge that 
the administrative definition of region does not necessarily coincide with the relevant 
definition based on interactions. A key area of study in economic geography is the modifiable 
area unit problem, the notion that aggregation by different scope and different boundaries 
may yield different outcome. In particular the size of regions seems to be an important driver 
of some measured elasticities14.  
Another aspect, recognized by the EU in its competitiveness report by Annoni P. and 
Dijkstra L. (2013 p5) is related to accounting employment in the case of large cities. This is 
not a problem for Paris (as Ile-de-France includes commuters), but it is for London, which is 
actually cut into two NUTS2 regions. The problem is particularly important for also for 
Brussels, Prague, Berlin, Amsterdam and Vienna. Annoni P. and Dijkstra L. (2013) detail 
several other regional boundary related issues.  
Given data requirements, this is not a real issue for us, NUTS2 seems the realistic area of 
study. Looking at evidence from MAPCOMPETE, we know that data are typically collected 
according to the administrative definition, at NUTS2 or NUTS3 level. It is only at a few 
countries, such as France or Hungary, where data may be actually linked to corporate registry 
with information on the municipality the firm is located.  
                                                        
13 See Chapter 2 of Castellani and Koch (2015) as well as http://mapcompete.eu/meta-webtool  
14 See Briant et al (2012) and Békés and Harasztosi (2015) 
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One potential solution may starting with NUTS2 level, but considering some additional 
regional aggregation.  
B. Narrow industries, small regions 
Calculating this index faces a challenge specific to the use of anonymized data: data providers 
retain the right to suppress observations to prevent external identification of corporate data.  
In particular, calculating values at regional and sectoral level often face secrecy problems by 
the data providers. One typical barrier to computation of each region-sector cell is a 
minimum requirement of firm count: each cell has to be made up of at least a few firms (3-6 
depending on countries). This may be an issue when industries are narrowly defined or 
regions are small. At this stage we believe this not a major issue, but may matter for small 
regions and small industries – requiring sectoral aggregation.  
C. Extreme granularity– top firm accounting 
The next problem is more important as it goes to the core of our exercise. Data providers also 
suppress cells when one firm is too important (for example, its sales represent more than 
70% of total sales of firms in that cell). As a result, when the sector-region cell includes the 
top firm in that sector, the cell result may be suppressed even if there are other firms present. 
Given the narrow approach, this may generate a huge bias.  
These problems, may be reduced by aggregating industries (such as food and beverage) or 
aggregating regions. This is a key reason for choosing NUTS2 as more realistic level as 
opposed to NUTS315. However, large firm problem may prevail, and there is no easy fix, it 
may only be solved by co-operation between NSIs and Eurostat.  
Beyond issues relevant to this index, the main hindrance in calculating our preferred 
index is access to data. As argued in the book by), data availability is typically excellent to 
good in EU countries, but accessibility is often rather difficult. To calculate our index, one 
needs access to the original data or ask someone with access to run do files. However, given 
differences across countries, this latter approach is rather cumbersome. Furthermore, in 
several countries, in France and Germany, for instance, there are legal barriers to get access.    
As a result, the only possible way to calculate these indices would be to get Eurostat 
coordinate a project with scientific involvement, whereby national statistical offices calculate 
values based on a common and harmonized approach.  
                                                        
15 To see NUTS3 level data, one should aggregate sectors into a handful of macro sectors. 
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D. Firms: observation and reality – from establishments to value chains 
The typical unit of observation is legal entities. As a result, there plenty of other measurement 
problems. Almost all datasets would not pertain information about business groups, within 
which transfers may bias a great deal of estimates – a major issue in services. Observation of 
establishments that may do production away from HQ may also be a problem, even if the 
most frequent case is that production does not take place far away from production. While in 
several EU countries, there are plans to improve data quality, there is not much we can do at 
this stage.  
Another measurement problem is a consequence of multinational groups. Exports to non-
EU countries are collected and assembled by national and EU institutions. Ideally, the final 
destination is measured. However, multinational companies exercise a great freedom in 
terms of organizing in which country authorities actually take care of customs and procedure. 
Hence, a multinational company‟s Czech affiliate may export to China, but it will not be 
picked up as the company may concentrate its customs activity in, say, the Netherlands. Once 
again, there is very little we can do other than acknowledge that our measure is likely to be 
biased to regions that are more specialized in global commerce.  
In particular, some industries may be organized rather differently in terms of value 
chains, distribution networks. This may lead to countries specialized in some industries to 
export more or less directly to non-EU countries. Industries with flatter value chains should 
create less bias due to presence of distributors or specialized trading subsidiaries in some 
countries.  For our purpose, we compare industries instead of aggregated economy, and we 
may disregard the wholesale sector as well.  
E. Business services 
Trade in services are typically not as well accounted for as in trade in goods, potentially 
downward biasing regions with a strong service sector. Fortunately, trade in services are 
included in firm level data16. The bad news is that measurement, pricing issues may typically 
be of greater importance for services than for goods trade. It is also much easier to sell 
services globally from the HQ – either in the big city or even from the multinational company 
center. This may downward bias NSX of regions that are more specialized in business 
services. The result of these opposing biases are unknown and may vary country by country.  
                                                        
16 Included in trade data, HS6 starting with 98 and 99 
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5. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
In this paper, we aimed at arguing for a new approach in thinking about regional 
competitiveness and offer a new measure of this.  
First, we argued that there are some solid economics argument in favor of thinking in 
terms of regions as units. Proximity matters as agglomeration externalities influence firm 
performance, these externalities decay fast with regions being close to a relevant area for 
most spillovers, and granularity is key, as a few large firms matter regionally more than in 
countries. Second, we made case in favor of an outcome type measure instead of a mix of 
drivers. An outcome measure has the advantage of transparency and allows for future 
enquiry about the relationship of outcome (firm performance) and potential drivers such as 
infrastructure or local R&D. Third, we proposed a measure based on firms‟ sales in non-EU 
markets. This approach has the advantage of comparability across EU countries and easy 
calculation. 
Finally, we looked at data availability and access across Europe and concluded that our 
index may be calculated given available data for almost all EU countries. At the same time 
such an exercise would require either Eurostat co-ordination, or collaboration of great many 
institutions. We believe that what is needed at this stage is a Eurostat coordinated effort – 
with potential researcher participation. One the index is calculated, future research may 
analyze key drivers of differences of firm performance in various regions. Co-ordination with 
national statistical institutions is also key to manage confidentiality issues.  
Furthermore, with improved data quality, research into the importance and structure of 
business groups, the diversity establishment networks, or accounting practices of services 
trade may shed light to potential biases in measurement.   
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Appendix 
A. Example:  Hungarian regions 
Before creating variables, one needs to make some choices: (i) how to best define outside 
markets, (ii) what regional aggregation, and (iii) what sectoral aggregation. Here, we‟ll 
experiment with two outside market options: [1]: China and [2] All countries outside 
Europe17. As for regional aggregation, NUTS2 level is necessary to get sensible industry level 
values. NUTS3 is only possible when using total economy aggregates – ie when we assume 
simple additivity of industry competitiveness values. As for industry, for most industries, 2-
digit level is the maximum to get enough firms. For a few broad sectors, such as machinery, 
3-digit level would be possible.  
The first step uses firm-destination- product specific data, mostly available from customs. 
Product data are typically available at HS6 level. There are two alternatives to get industry 
level values when exports are given at product level. The more direct approach is to sum 
export sales by products and apply a product-industry conversion filter to get firm-
destination-industry level export data. We suggest using 2 digit NACE rev2 industry setting. 
The second, easier but less precise approach is to classify a firm‟s all exports by the firm‟s 
primary NACE code.  
For each firm-NACE, calculate X1_id_nace: Firm-NACE-Export to China, X2_id_nace: 
Firm_NACE-Export to outside Europe , X_id_nace: Firm-NACE total export. Generate 
X1S_id:=sum of X1_id_nace; X2S_id:=sum of X2_id_nace; XS_id:=sum of X_id_nace 18 
The second step, is to work on firm level data to calculate, for each firm, L_id as the 
number of employees and Y_id  as the total sales of firms. We can generate L_id_nace := L_id_ 
*X_id_nace /XS_id 
In the third step, we need to merge data to have firm-nace level observations. We sum by 
region-sector, to get total exports to China / outside EU by industry and region and create 
number of firms per region-sector, number of exporting to China firms per region-sector so 
that we can discuss extensive and intensive margins. Finally, we create number of 
employment per sector-region using L_id_nace. 
Table 1 presents NXS index values for NACE2 manufacturing sectors.  Calculations are 
based on total non-Europe (EU28+) exports19. For instance, let us consider the food 
manufacturing sector (#10). The most competitive region is South-East. There we find that 
                                                        
17 EU28+ Andorra, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Moldova, Monaco, 
Montenegro, Norway, San Marino, Serbia,Switzerland, Ukraine, Vatican City 
18 NB: Firm id, Location at region level (NUTS2), L, Y, X1S, X2S, X3S –same for all nace. X1, X2, X3 and L varies 
by nace. 
19 We repeated this exercise for EU28 exports as well and found a 60% correlation. China alone cannot be 
determined at 2-digit industry level.  
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an average sized firm in that region exports to outside EU twice (216%) the Hungarian 
average. In other words, we do not consider the mass of firms because that would also imply 
specialization, but instead, we correct a mass of exports food producers by the employment at 
those firms. This figure is high when firms on average (i.e relative to their size) export a lot to 
outside of the EU.  
Considering manufacturing, West and Center-West regions are the most competitive on 
average (weighted by employment in industries), followed by the Central region (including 
Budapest). As is visible from the table, there is substantial variation across regions. South-
West does well in food, while North is competitive in chemicals.  
Table 1. 
NXS index values for Hungary 
EXTRA EU
10   food 
11   
beverages
13   textiles
14   wearing 
apparel
15   leather 
and related 
16   wood 
17   paper 
and paper 
20   chemicals 
22   rubber 
and plastic 
Central (incl Budapest) 121% 94% 56% 236% 31% 101% 89% 61% 48%
West-Center 21% 607% 77% 8% 366% 187% 299% 20% 111%
West 113% 15% 189% 4% 315% 23% 6% 34% 65%
South-West 21% 140% 93% 240% 68% 508% 10% 25% 40%
North 16% 133% 61% 2% 27% 8% 29% 281% 148%
North-Center 55% 16% 90% 5% 104% 16% 7% 217% 204%
South-East 216% 91% 160% 12% 3% 62% 13% 13% 138%
weights (SUM EMP) 86630 11458 8362 13594 11126 14989 11111 29139 35308
EXTRA EU
23   other 
non-metallic 
mineral 
24   basic 
metals
25   
fabricated 
metal
27   
electrical 
equipment
28   
machinery, 
equipment 
29   motor 
vehicles
31   
furniture
32 Other 
manufacturing
weighted avg
Central (incl Budapest) 102% 191% 67% 166% 101% 21% 13% 93% 97%
West-Center 179% 86% 189% 89% 178% 112% 295% 248% 134%
West 80% 61% 233% 100% 142% 223% 143% 19% 120%
South-West 1% 15% 17% 64% 9% 24% 17% 8% 49%
North 2% 31% 64% 23% 61% 55% 9% 127% 60%
North-Center 23% 25% 64% 35% 44% 1% 39% 98% 60%
South-East 62% 10% 39% 21% 36% 21% 4% 26% 68%
weights (SUM EMP) 19547 16361 36792 70067 79434 57291 17858 13164
 
Notes. The table shows values for NSX values for Hungary, at 2-digit NACE2 industries and NUTS2 
regions. Values are calculated with only Hungarian data, ie. 100% would be the average region-sector 
value in Hungary. Red numbers are based on imputations due to suppressed data (too few firms or 
presence of very large firms) 
 
B. Example:  EFIGE results for selected EU regions 
In the lack of official data, one could use private data or survey information. One possibility 
could be using Amadeus, the European firm level database curated by Bureau van Dijk. Data 
include balance sheet information including export sales. However, this information is not 
available for most countries.   
At the same time, the survey EFIGE offers a way to compare regions in selected countries. 
The dataset covers 14 thousand EU manufacturing firms with at least 10 employees, located 
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in seven countries: Germany, Italy, France, Spain, UK, Austria and Hungary. The dataset 
includes a great deal of information about internationalization activities of these firms20. 
The advantage of the dataset, is that for each firm, we know the share of sales exported to 
outside Europe, calculated by multiplying (i) the share of exports to sales and (ii) share of 
non-Europe exports to total exports. Unfortunately, the sample is not large enough to 
consider industries.  
Before turning to results, please note that the EFIGE dataset does not include exports 
values only size of the company by labor. To partially remedy this, we merged the data with 
information from Amadeus on total sales revenue. As a result, we generated our preferred 
index for most regions in 6 countries – Amadeus sales data is very poor in the UK. 
Furthermore, we also generated a simplified index, available for all regions in the sample: 
instead of adding up export sales in euros, we weight „normalized export share‟ by labor only. 
Hence our second measure, is a regional labor weighted average non-Europe exports to sales 
ratio.  
Highest index values are attained by regions in center of France, North-West of Germany, 
North of Italy and some regions in Austria. Low values are attached to Hungarian regions 
apart from the Centre, South Italy, Eastern part of Germany, East Spain. The simplified 
measure would put a great many UK regions on top as well. 
Of course, this is just an illustration of our approach, given data weakness, actual results 
should be treated with great caution.  
 
                                                        
20 For details, see. Altomonte et al. (2013) 
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Figure 2. 
Map of NSX regional competitiveness index 
 
Notes: Calculated using the EFIGE survey for 2009. The index is calculated for most but not regions 
in the sample in 6 EU countries (no UK data). Generated by weighing non-Europe export values by 
labor (as defined above) 
 
Figure 3.  
Map of NSX regional competitiveness index – simplified version 
 
Notes: Calculated using the EFIGE survey for 2009. The index is calculated for all regions in the 
sample in 7 EU countries. Simplified version: generated only by using number of employees as 
weights disregarding labor productivity.  
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